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Abstract 
This article examines the desirability of plea bargaining in Ethiopia focusing on 
its policy justifications as encapsulated under the 2011 FRDE Criminal Justice 
Policy. Emphasizing upon the specific contexts of Ethiopia, the article analyzes 
policy documents, laws and comparative literature. The policy relies on the 
traditional rationales of plea bargaining. However, most of the elements in the 
rationales are under continuous criticism, and thus not compelling. The 
exception could be the efficiency rationale which presumably has a special 
force in attracting developing economies like Ethiopia. Yet in actuality, this is 
not as compelling as imagined at least on two fronts. First, the rationale is 
divorced from being principled in that lack of resources or the desire to spare 
resources cannot vindicate an encroachment of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Second, the contextual investigation of the trial and case delay in 
Ethiopia lends no conclusive support for it. If trials are exceptions and simple, 
they will not be resource intensive, and thus are manageable with limited 
resources. To a limited extent, plea bargaining is acknowledged for efficiency, 
but this comes at the expense of the overarching values of criminal justice 
namely fairness and accuracy and probably with other unintended perverse 
consequences: violation of defendants’ rights, corruption and abuses, wrongful 
convictions, among others. 
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Plea bargaining has been a subject of controversy since its inception. While 
proponents praise it for its role in managing caseload and enhancing the 
efficiency of the criminal process,1 opponents challenge the very foundation of 
plea bargaining as contrary to constitutional principles, ethics, and fair trial 
guarantees.2 The major criticisms against plea bargaining include the following: 
that by allowing lenient sentencing in exchange for a guilty plea it makes 
criminal justice too soft on criminals and thus undermines the deterrent effect of 
criminal sanctions3; that by inducing plea offers, it is likely to produce 
involuntary guilty pleas and risk innocents plead guilty4; that it shifts power to 
prosecutors leaving judges to do little more than ratify prosecutorial plea 
bargaining decisions5 ; that it ignores victim interests; that it offends fair trial 
                                           
1 Kobayashi, Bruce H. & John R. Lott (1996), “In defense of criminal defense expenditures 
and plea-bargaining”, International Review of Law & Economics Vol.16, pp.397-416; 
K.V.K. Santhy (2013), “Plea Bargaining in Indian and US Criminal Law: Confessions for 
Concessions” NALSAR  Law Review Vol. 7, No. 1,p. 99. On the economic analysis of plea 
bargaining, see William M. Landes (1971), “An Economic Analysis of the Courts”, 
Journal of Law & Economics Vol. 14 No.1, pp. 61-107; James E. Bond (1982), Plea 
Bargaining and Guilty Pleas, 2nd. Ed. (New York: Clark Boardman & Co), (discussing the 
constitutional status of plea bargaining and standards for accepting guilty pleas); Frank H. 
Easterbrook (1983), “Criminal Procedure as a Market System”, J. Legal Stud. Vol. 12, pp. 
308-09 (arguing that plea bargaining is desirable as a mechanism for setting the price of 
crime). 
2 Stephanos Bibas (2012), The Machinery of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press);  S. Schulhofer (1991), “Plea bargaining as disaster” Yale Law Journal 
Vol. 101, p. 1979. 
3 See generally D. Guidorizz (1998), “Should We Really Ban Plea bargaining? The Core 
Concerns for Plea bargaining Critics” Emory Law Journal Vol.47, p.753; Kenneth Kipnis 
(1976), “Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea”, Ethics, Vol.86, p.93; R.A. Fine (1987) 
“Plea bargaining: An Unnecessary Evil”, Marquette Law Review, Vol.70, No.4, p.615; 
Sam W. Calan (1979), “An Experience in Justice without Plea Negotiation”, Law & 
Society Review, Vol.13, p. 327.                      
4 This is commonly referred to as the innocence problem. For more, see F. Andrew Hessick 
III & Reshma Saujani (2002), “Plea bargaining and convicting the Innocent: The Role of 
the Prosecutor, the Defence Counsel, and the Judge”, Byu. J. Pub. L., Vol.16, p. 189; 
Katherine J. Strandburg (2003)), “Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents”, 35 Conn. 
L. Rev. Vol. 35, p. 1336; Fred C. Zacharias (1998), “Justice in Plea Bargaining” Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. Vol.39, pp.1151-55. For the discussion of this from the Ethiopian context, 
see Alemu Meheretu, “The Innocence Problem in Context: The Case of Ethiopia”, 
forthcoming. 
5 This blame works well in those jurisdictions which bestow prosecutors with broader 
discretionary powers. See Maximo Langer (2005-06), “Rethinking Plea bargaining: The 
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure”, 33 
Am. J. Crim. L. Vol.33, p.223; Andrew Sanders et al (2010), Criminal Justice (Oxford 
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rights6- it  circumvents the standard of proof, contradicts the right to silence, the 
right to be presumed innocent, the right against self-incrimination and the right 
to equality. 
Despite these controversies, plea bargaining has not only occupied an 
overwhelmingly dominant position in adversarial systems, but has also 
transcended diverse justice structures including the classical inquisitorial 
systems. Likewise, apparently motivated by this trend, Ethiopia has adopted 
plea bargaining at policy level and a draft criminal procedure is underway to 
emulate it. This article investigates the justifications put forward to introduce 
plea bargaining in Ethiopia. In particular, it addresses the following specific 
issues: the rationales for Ethiopia to introduce plea bargaining and their force, 
and whether plea bargaining is desirable in Ethiopia. The article has benefited 
from the rich literature on plea bargaining but at the same time has focused on 
the specific contexts of Ethiopia. It uses a thorough analysis of policy 
documents, laws and comparative literature. 
The article is structured into five sections followed by a conclusion. The first 
section provides a brief comparison of factors that necessitate plea bargaining as 
applied in diverse criminal procedure structures. The second section addresses 
the legal/policy framework of plea bargaining. Sections 3, 4 and 5 investigate 
the justifications put forward to introduce plea bargaining in Ethiopia and 
appraises them in the context of the Ethiopian criminal justice system.  
1. Why Plea Bargaining: Overview of Some Jurisdictions  
This section is about a brief comparison of the purposes/factors that necessitate 
plea bargaining as applied in diverse criminal procedure structures. The 
overview refers to USA, England, Germany, and Italy.7 Its purpose is to lay 
some background for a subsequent analysis of the Ethiopian experience.  
Many jurisdictions employ various forms of negotiated justice including plea 
bargaining and cooperation agreements in order to manage caseload pressure, 
increase the efficiency of their criminal justice and to assist the prosecution of 
                                                                                                            
University Press); S. J. Schulhofer (1988), “Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory 
System”, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.17, pp.43-82. 
6 See Stephanos Bibas (2012), The Machinery of Criminal Justice, supra note 2.; Penny 
Darbyshire (2000), “The Mischief of Plea bargaining and Sentencing Rewards”, Criminal 
Law Review, p.895; Douglas Smith (1986), “The Plea-Bargaining Controversy”,  Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.77, No.3, pp.949-968. 
7 These countries are selected on the assumption that they represent the two major criminal 
procedure structures which inspired the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code -the 
adversarial and the inquisitorial systems. The selection of Italy and Germany can further be 
justified on the reforms both countries undertook to introduce and formalize plea 
bargaining, respectively. 
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complex crimes.8 However, the context of caseload pressure varies across 
jurisdictions. It could be attributable to social factors such as an increase in 
crime rates especially that of complex and organized crimes, as is the case in 
some European countries or it could be imputable to developments of criminal 
law or procedure (over criminalization and complex procedures) as is the case in 
adversarial structures such as England and the USA.9  In the latter`s case, it is 
widely believed that the extremely complex procedure in adversarial criminal 
trials, in particular the burdensome jury trial, which is time-consuming and 
resource intensive, has largely contributed for the infiltration of plea bargaining 
into the criminal justice system.10 
Germany which traditionally insisted on the strict adherence of the principle 
of compulsory prosecution relaxed it by allowing bargaining over petty 
offenses.11 This coupled with the rise of complex crimes such as white collar, 
environmental and drug related crimes12 provide a leeway for negotiation to 
flourish.13 It is suggested that proving mens rea and establishing causation 
                                           
8 The latter applies to the USA, Germany and England in varying degrees and it is often 
called cooperation agreement, a notion which is different from plea bargaining proper and 
is not covered here. See infra note 28. 
9 See generally Regina Rauxloh (2011), “Formalization of Plea Bargaining in Germany- 
Will the New Legislation Be Able to Square the Circle?” Fordham Int'l L.J , Vol.34, p. 
296. 
10 For more discussions, see Albert W. Alschuler (1968), “The Prosecutor's Role in Plea 
Bargaining”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 36. No.1, pp.50-112; Malcolm 
M. Feeley (1997), “Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process: 
The Origins of Plea Bargaining”, Isr. L. Rev., Vol.31, pp. 202-05; John H. Langbein 
(1979). “Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining” L. & Soc`ty Rev.Vol.13, 
pp.262-265; For a different explanation, see M. McConville and C. Mirsky (2005), Jury 
Trials and Plea Bargaining: A True History (Oxford: Hart Publishing).  
11 Yue ma (2002), “Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea bargaining in the United States, 
France, Germany and Italy: A Comparative Perspective”, International Criminal Justice 
Review, Vol.12, p.36. 
12 One may wonder why plea bargaining in Germany is often linked to such crimes. The 
complex legal and evidence issues these crimes involve could be one explanation. Yet, 
this may not justify the matter sufficiently as similar problems of complexity may exist in 
other crimes too.  Some commentators justify this on the courts` inclination of treating 
defendants of white-collar crimes favorably simply based on their economic and social 
status as “they are often the most respected members of the society from similar 
backgrounds as prosecutors and judges”. See Kai-d. Bussmann (1991), The Discovery of 
Informality: Negotiations in Criminal Proceedings and their Legal Construction, p. 13 
cited in Regina Rauxloh, above at note 9, p.303. Scholars argue that judges and 
prosecutors showed more willingness to negotiate and more respect to defendants of a 
high social status. 
13 See generally H Jung (1995), “The Criminal Process in the Federal Republic of Germany-
An overview [in Demas–Marty(ed), The Criminal Process and Human Rights: towards a 
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complicates investigation as well as trial, consequently causing a swelling of 
caseloads.14 This interacted with the insufficiency of the German Criminal 
Procedure Code to cope with the matter, creates a fertile ground for informal 
settlements, and pushes criminal justice actors to see plea bargaining as an ideal 
way of dispensing with cases.15 Using plea bargaining and cooperation 
agreements as tools to prosecute complex crimes is not unique to Germany. 
Indeed, it also serves similar purposes in the USA16 and England.17 
In Italy, its conviction to the principle of legality, amendments and court 
decisions meant to guard defendant’s rights, and the absence of guilty plea 
procedures, all complicated the trial process and consequently exposed the 
country to massive case backlogs that attracted severe criticisms by the 
European Court of Human Rights.18 This forced reformers in Italy to consider 
alternatives to trials including plea bargaining, so that the efficiency of Italian 
criminal justice could be enhanced.19 
In the jurisdictions stated above, other than Italy, plea bargaining emerged 
through practice20 and it was subsequently formalized by law. In Germany, for 
example, plea bargaining was practiced for nearly four decades before it was 
formalized in 2009.21 It is striking to see a code-based criminal procedure in 
                                                                                                            
European Consciousness (Dordrecht, Boston, London: MartinusNijhoff Publishers), pp. 
61-63]. 
14 Regina Rauxloh (2011), Formalization of plea bargaining, supra note 9. 
15 Id, p. 300 & 327. 
16 In the USA, mostly cooperation agreements serve such a purpose and are important law 
enforcement tools. See Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell (2006), “Negotiating Justice: 
Prosecutorial Perspective on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia” Am. 
Crim. L. Rev.Vol.43, p.1073. 
17 In particular, this applies in serious fraud offences. 
18 The problem was so rampant that the Court, on a number of occasions, expressed its 
concerns over Italy`s violation of Art 6(1) of ECHR which guarantees fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable period of time. The court condemned Italy in a series of its 
decisions on delays and prolonged pre-trial detentions. See Jeffrey J. Miller (1990), “Plea 
Bargaining and Its Analogues under the New Italian Criminal Procedure Code and in the 
United States: Toward a New Understanding of Comparative Criminal Procedure”, N.Y.U. 
J. INT'L L. &POL. Vol.22, pp. 221-222. 
19 William Pizzi and Mariangela Montagna (2004), “The Battle to Establish an Adversarial 
Trial System in Italy”, Mich. J. Int’l L.Vol.25, p. 437. 
20 Since its inception plea bargaining has been justified from the perspectives of efficiency 
and remorse. In the 1970s when the propriety of plea bargaining was increasingly 
challenged in the USA and England, courts and practitioners defended it from remorse 
and efficiency angle. (Brady in the US and Turner in the UK are examples to this). See 
supra note 10. 
21 Regina Rauxloh, supra note 9;  Stephen C. Thaman (2007), “Plea bargaining, Negotiating 
Confessions and Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases”, Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law Vol. 11. 
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Germany, in a structure which insists on mandatory prosecution surrendering to 
an `informal` practice such as plea bargaining. It is less surprising that plea 
bargaining in the US or in England evolved through practice, because in these 
jurisdictions, no codified law of criminal procedure could regulate the discretion 
that had existed. In Italy, however, the situation is different because plea 
bargaining was introduced by law as part of reforming the Italian Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
The extent to which countries rely on plea bargaining provides an intriguing 
contrast. No jurisdiction22 relies on plea bargaining like the U.S does; more than 
90% of cases are resolved via plea bargaining.23 On the other hand, about 50% 
of cases are handled  through plea agreements in Germany24 ; around 68% of 
cases in England and Wales in magistrates’ courts and 72 % in Crown courts get 
disposed of through  guilty pleas without a trial, albeit, not all necessarily with 
plea bargaining.25 
2. Policy/Legal Framework in Ethiopia  
As discussed above, the experience of jurisdictions suggests that plea bargaining 
finds its way into justice systems either through practice or reforms. Apparently, 
the latter applies to Ethiopia i.e., plea bargaining is introduced as part of 
reforming the criminal justice system. This is not to imply that plea bargaining 
is completely alien to Ethiopia. Indeed, researches reveal that an informal and 
rudimentary plea bargaining exists.26 But so far the practice had no chance of 
influencing the reform formally. No attempt is made to study it either. 
The Ethiopian Criminal Justice Policy (hereinafter the ECJ Policy) has 
introduced plea bargaining. The ECJ policy lays down the framework for plea 
bargaining and requires a new criminal procedure code to be issued to emulate 
it. In response, a draft criminal procedure code is underway. This does not mean 
                                           
22 Perhaps the exception could be Scotland where in 2004-05, 97 per cent of all district court 
cases (excluding dismissals) were resolved through plea bargaining. Id.,  p.38.  
23 United States Sentencing Commission, Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year 2009 at 
<http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2009.htm> (Accessed: July 14, 2010). 
24 Maike Frommann (2009), “Regulating Plea bargaining in Germany: Can the Italian 
Approach serve as a Model to Guarantee the Independence of German Judges”, Hanse 
Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 200.  
25 Data from CPS Annual Report 2011/2012 available at: 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2011/annex_b.html> (Accessed: 15th May 
2013).   
26 Alemu Meheretu (2014), Introducing Plea bargaining in Ethiopia: Concerns and 
Prospects (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, UK), pp.135-164; see also UNODC 
(2011), Assessment of the Criminal Justice system in Ethiopia; in support of the 
Government`s reform efforts towards an effective and efficient criminal justice system, p. 
54.  
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that there is no law at all dealing with plea bargaining. In fact, while defining 
the powers and the duties of the then Ministry of Justice and now the Attorney 
General, Proclamation No. 691/2010 and Proclamation No.943/2016 under 
Article 6(1)(d)27 entrust the Attorney General with the power to plea bargain. 
This together with the ECJ policy represents the first step towards providing a 
legal/policy framework for plea bargaining in Ethiopia. Surely, one cannot 
speak of a legal framework, which clearly and sufficiently regulates the 
institution of plea bargaining. This is something the upcoming Criminal 
Procedure Code (albeit far behind schedule) is expected to articulate. 
That said, a quasi-plea bargaining28, in which suspects receive lenient 
treatment or immunity in exchange for cooperating in the prosecution of others, 
is recognized under the Anti-Corruption29, Anti-terrorism30, and Witness and 
Whistle-blower’s Protection Proclamations.31 
3. Appraisal of Policy Justifications of Plea Bargaining: 
Enhancement of ‘Efficiency’ 
Of the various reforms the ECJ policy targets, the introduction of plea 
bargaining represents an unprecedented and ambitious venture. But what 
motivates Ethiopia to emulate plea bargaining? Would it serve its intended 
purposes? The ECJ Policy tries to justify plea bargaining based on its traditional 
rationales: (a) that it enhances the efficiency of the criminal justice system; (b) 
that it promotes remorse and rehabilitation of offenders; and (c) that it helps 
avoid the trauma of trial for defendants and victims.32 This section examines the 
justification of efficiency33 and appraises it in the context of the Ethiopian 
                                           
27 While the first proclamation defines the powers and duties of Ministers, the second 
proclamation establishes the office of the Attorney General. 
28 This, often known as cooperation agreement, is different from plea bargaining. While 
cooperation agreements are about finding evidence and thus do not avoid full-scale trials, 
plea bargaining is about avoiding or shortening full-scale trials. Still, most countries 
which adopt plea bargaining recognize cooperation agreements as a vital tool of garnering 
relevant evidence in a criminal participation –particularly to investigate and prosecute 
those suspects up in the ladder of a criminal activity. It is important to note that 
cooperation agreements and plea bargaining may overlap –a defendant admitting guilt and 
at the same time providing information against his fellow offenders. 
29Article 43(1), The Federal Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
(Amendment) Proclamation, Proclamation No. 239/2001. 
30 Article 33, TheAnti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009. 
31 Article 3, Protection of Witnesses and Whistle-blowers of Criminal Offences 
Proclamation No.699/2010. 
32 FDRE (2011), The Criminal Justice Policy of Ethiopia, p. 36 (hereinafter the ECJ Policy). 
33 Here efficiency is used in relation to resource and time savings.  
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criminal justice system. The second and third justifications, are examined in 
Sections 4 and 5. 
The need for a more efficient resolution of cases is the major explanation for 
most jurisdictions to resort to plea bargaining.34 Plea bargaining is praised for 
saving judicial as well as prosecutorial time and resources. For Ethiopia too, the 
major motivation to adopt plea bargaining relates to efficiency gains. The 
Ethiopian Criminal Justice policy subscribes to this justification in providing 
that plea bargaining cuts costs and time spent in full-scale trials; and that it helps 
reduce case backlog and workload.35This rationale stresses on the comparative 
efficiency advantage plea bargaining offers to the justice system: its advantage 
to conserve time and resources which otherwise would be consumed in full-
scale trials; and its instrumentality to manage criminal caseloads. 
Ostensibly, the efficiency justification is the strongest justifications for 
adopting plea bargaining in Ethiopia, a nation which has been struggling with 
massive case backlogs.36 In theory, this has far-reaching implications in 
expediting the process and promoting speedy trial, enhancing access to justice 
and improving the conditions of detention centres and prisons. For instance, by 
minimizing the amount of time defendants spend in pre-trial detention, it may 
improve the handling of suspects/ detainees in Ethiopia, a country known of its 
congested and poor detention and prison conditions.37 However, a principle-
based as well as contextual investigation of this justification suggests that it is 
not as compelling as it seems to be. A separate elaboration of this argument is in 
order below. 
3.1 The efficiency justification: challenging the conventional wisdom 
There seems a conventional wisdom that plea bargaining represents the most 
efficient (albeit, not the most proper) modality of case disposition that 
guarantees efficiency in any criminal justice system. With plea bargaining, it is 
suggested that considerable time and resources are conserved. Yet, viewed from 
the Ethiopian reality, this conception is defective on the following fronts: (i) the 
                                           
34 Though delay and the need for efficiency appear to be the underlying and ultimate 
justification for plea bargaining in any system, the cause of delay and the context in which 
plea bargaining developed differs significantly.  
35 The ECJ Policy, supra note 32, p.36 (author’s translation). 
36 Despite the rise of caseload, one study shows that there is significant improvement in 
managing it at federal level. See World Bank, Uses and Users of Justice in Africa: The 
Case of Ethiopia's Federal Courts. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/07/13145799/uses-users-justice-africa-
case-ethiopias-federal-courts>  (Accessed 7 October 2014) p.11. 
37 On prison conditions, see Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 2012, United 
States Department of State available at  
   <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/af/204120.htm> (Accessed 14 March 2013). 
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efficiency justification is divorced from being principled and completely trades 
off other sacred values of criminal justice which Ethiopia needs most; (ii) the 
examination of the justification in context lends no conclusive support to such 
an outcome and the desired efficiency can be ensured without plea bargaining. 
3.1.1 The efficiency justification is unprincipled  
Plea bargaining is “…more a mechanism of convenience and ‘mutual benefit’38 
than an issue of morality, legality or constitutionality”.39 It hardly relies on 
principled justifications from moral, legal and constitutional perspectives.40 
Modern constitutions, including the FDRE Constitution guarantee the right to 
trial. To induce waiver of this right by offering sentence or charge/count 
concessions does not square with constitutional rights of defendants. As William 
Stuntz succinctly puts it:41 “in criminal trials the constitution is omnipresent, in 
guilty pleas [plea bargaining] it is nearly invisible”.The most affected 
constitutional rights include: the right to be presumed innocent, the right to 
equality, the right to appeal, the right to silence, the right to public hearing and 
the right to legal counsel.42 Further, plea bargaining creates what is commonly 
termed as trial penalty: “[i]t would be quite unacceptable that, in a legal system 
which presumes innocence and which permits every person to go to trial, a 
person who was found guilty after trial should be punished more severely 
simply because he had not pled guilty”.43 
Certainly, jurisdictions embrace plea bargaining for economic/efficiency 
reasons. With the advent of plea bargaining it has become common that the most 
embellished values of criminal justice (i.e., fairness and accuracy), have been 
relegated and sacrificed for the value of economy.44 Nonetheless, the value of 
efficiency/economy is not something a criminal justice system pursues at all 
costs. Put simply, plea bargaining which involves “fundamental questions of 
                                           
38 This is controversial. The assumption in plea bargaining is that both parties would arrive 
at a mutually favorable or satisfactory settlement of the case. Yet, this is unrealistic. Quite 
conversely, studies often reveal that plea bargaining is dominated by the public 
prosecutor. See Donald G. Gifford (1983), “Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining the 
Control of Prosecutorial Discretion”, U. Ill. L. Rev. 37 p. 39; Maximo Langer (2006) 
“Rethinking Plea Bargaining, supra note 5, p.223. 
39 K.V.K. Santhy (2013), supra note 1, p. 1.  
40 S. Schulhofer (1991-92), supra note 2, p. 1979. 
41W. J. Stuntz (2006), “The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice”, Harv.L. Rev, Vol. 
119, p. 791. 
42 Supra note 6. For more on this from the Ethiopian context, see Alemu Meheretu (2016), 
“The Proposed Plea bargaining in Ethiopia: How it fares with Fundamental Principles of 
Criminal Law and Procedure?”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 10 No. 2.  
43Andrew Ashworth (1993), “The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Part 3:  Plea, 
Venue and Discontinuance”, Criminal law Review, Citing one judge p. 837. 
44 Regina Rauxloh, Formalization of Plea bargaining, supra note 9, p. 329. 
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sentencing policy, of propriety of compromising questions of criminal guilt, and 
of the use of governmental inducements to secure waivers of constitutional 
rights”45 is hardly justified in terms economic gains. Indeed, it is often the case 
that constitutional rights supersede claims of efficiency. 
The propriety of a criminal process must be primarily measured against its 
outcome accuracy and its fairness in arriving at such an outcome. Irrespective of 
their efficiency gains, laws and institutions which fail to uphold such values 
(i.e., fairness and accuracy) should not be accepted. As Rawls notes: 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or 
revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and institutions no matter how efficient 
and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. 46 
The efficiency-driven plea bargaining which inherently relates less to evidence 
and circumvents fundamental safeguards against wrongful convictions (such as 
presumption of innocence, strong standard of proof and other procedural rights), 
patently fails on this. The problems against accuracy and fairness that are 
imputable to plea bargaining are two-fold: convicting the innocent and acquitting 
or treating the culprit too leniently. Admittedly, trials are not immune from such 
accusations. Nonetheless, plea bargaining is much more prone to produce these 
problems than trials.47 With increasing sentence differentials tailored against the 
chance of acquittal along with strong risk aversion of the innocent than the 
guilty48, the unequal bargaining power of the parties49, lack of procedural 
                                           
45 Albert W. Alschuler (1983), “Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargaining”, in Encyclopedia of 
Crime and Justice, Vol.2, p.836. 
46 John Rawls (1991), A Theory of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 
p. 3. 
47 Unlike in trials once pleaded guilty, every one (including innocents) is convicted in plea 
bargains. See Albert W Alschuler (1981), “The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate”, Cal. 
L. Rev. Vol.69, p.714; Gregory M Gilchrist (2011),” Plea Bargains, Convictions and 
Legitimacy”,  Am. Crim. L. Rev. Vol.48, p. 145 (`More innocent defendants are convicted 
by plea bargains than would be by trials alone`). 
48 Studies show that the innocent is inherently more risk averse than the criminal because the 
latter willingly assumes risk while breaking the law in the first place. See Andrew Hessick 
and Reshma M Saujani, Plea bargaining and convicting the innocent, supra note 4, p. 201; 
Michael K Block & Vernon E Gerrety (1995) “Some Experimental Evidence on 
Differences between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk”, J. 
Legal Stud., Vol. 24, p. 138 (finding prisoners- criminals less risk averse than students-
innocents).  
49 Stressing on the huge difference in bargaining powers of the prosecutor and the defendant 
Langbien compares plea bargaining with torture. J H Langbien (1978),” Torture and Plea 
bargaining” Uni. Ch. L. Rev. Vol. 46, pp. 12-13. 
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safeguards, mistrust of the system50, innocents are likely to plead guilty simply 
because they believe it is rational to do so. Empirical evidence also supports this 
conclusion.51 
Further, by under-punishing many or not punishing them at all (it permits the 
dropping of one or either of the charges, or allows generous sentencing 
concessions) and over-punishing others (this happens due to overcharging or 
indirectly via trial penalties), plea bargaining undermines the purpose of 
punishment.  As rightly pointed out by Albert Alschuler52 “… [J]ust punishment 
must rest on what an offender did (and possibly on his or her personal 
characteristics) rather than on a defense attorney's bargaining skills or a 
defendant's tactical decision to ease the government's burdens of trial. [In this 
sense] … plea bargaining is incompatible with this principle”. By and large, 
“plea bargaining remains an inherently unfair and irrational process, one that 
turns major treatment consequences upon a single tactical decision irrelevant to 
any proper objective of criminal proceedings”.53 
For proponents of plea bargaining, the expediency/efficiency advantage 
overrides all the above fundamental objections. i.e.; a sacrifice of 
accuracy/fairness can be justified to reduce expenditures incurred in criminal 
process. However, it is simply unprincipled to subordinate the substantial 
interest the defendant and any society have on the accuracy of verdicts to 
economic gains. Human life and liberty are values that any society should 
cherish irrespective of their economic costs. 
On the other hand, some tend to consider plea bargaining as an exercise of 
balancing “against the risk that defendants may be tempted to plead guilty must 
be weighed the benefits to the system and to defendants of encouraging those 
                                           
50 See Andrew D. Leipold (2005), “How the Pre-trial Process Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions”, Am. Crim. L. Rev. Vol. 42, p.1154: 
    “Some innocent defendants are so mistrustful of the system that they believe their guilt 
is a foregone conclusion if they stand trial, and so they readily accept any inducement to 
plead. These feelings of mistrust are sometimes nourished by defense counsel who 
begin with a presumption of client guilt, and both begin and end the representation by 
looking for the best available bargain”. 
51 John Baldwin & Michael McConville (1978), “Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in 
England”, Law & Soc’y  Rev.Vol.13, pp.296–98 (discussing the innocence problem of 
plea bargaining in England); D. Michael Risinger (2007), “Innocents Convicted: An 
Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate”, J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 
Vol. 97, pp.778–79; Lucian E. Dervan and Vanessa A. Edkins (2013), “The Innocent 
Defendant's Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence 
Problem”, J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 1 Vol. 103, pp. 20-21. 
52 Albert W Alschuler (1992), “An exchange of Concessions”, NLJ Vol. 142, p 937. 
53 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea bargaining debate, supra note 47, p. 652. 
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who are in fact guilty to plead guilty”.54 Yet, “it is simply impermissible to 
balance the virtues of trial against the economic costs of trial”.55 
The foregoing concerns are all the more important to Ethiopia whose 
trials/courts are less utilized and whose criminal justice system is 
underdeveloped and still struggles to fully uphold the values of fairness and 
accuracy. In particular, the problem of limited /no access to legal counsel, 
prolonged pre-trial detention and poor conditions of detention centres, and fact 
finding problems –abuses of arrest and remand, lack of scientific and forensic 
evidence, absence of pre-trial review of evidence56– all conspire to aggravate the 
concerns and  result in the miscarriage of justice. 
Undeniably, Ethiopian policymakers have anticipated the dangers of plea 
bargaining and provided for measures directed at arresting its flaws. These 
include such guarantees as the requirement of sufficient evidence that warrants 
conviction, legal representation, and judicial approval of the plea agreement. 
However, the above guarantees are less likely to contain the inherent and 
contextual blemishes of plea bargaining and are thus incapable of ensuring its 
fairness and accuracy for reasons relating to: (i) the nature of the guarantees 
which are prone to circumventions; (ii) the legal, material and structural 
problems compounding the Ethiopian legal system; and (iii) the nature of plea 
bargaining which involves powerful sentencing differentials and sustains 
considerable power asymmetry between the adversaries.57 
3. 1.2  The efficiency justification in context  
The contextual interrogation of efficiency justification invites one to closely 
examine the degree of complexity of the criminal process (in particular that of 
trials), the size of demand and workload, the nature of case delay, the 
availability of other legitimate ways of case disposition and the possible 
perverse effects of plea bargaining. Examined from these perspectives, the 
efficiency rationale hardly fits in as a strong raison d’être for plea bargaining in 
Ethiopia.  
a) The nature of the criminal process 
In adversarial jurisdictions which are regarded as the birth place of plea 
bargaining, the complex jury trial, party autonomy (which drains considerable 
time and resources58), and over-procedures of the criminal process are often said 
                                           
54 Andrew Ashworth, The Royal Commission, supra note 43, p .837. 
55 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea bargaining debate, supra note 47, pp.671& 677. 
56 AlemuMeheretu, Introducing Plea bargaining, supra note 26, pp. 170-184. 
57 Ibid. For detailed discussions, see AlemuMeheretu, The Innocence Problem in Context, 
supra note 4. 
58 Jenny McEwan (2011), “From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in 
Transition”, Legal Studies Vol. 31, p. 544.  
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to have triggered the use of trial avoidance procedures as plea bargaining.59 The 
extreme complex procedure in adversarial criminal trials, in particular the 
ponderous jury trial is often blamed for its inefficiency60: “the rise of adversary 
procedure and the law of evidence injected vast complexity into jury trial and 
made it unworkable as a routine dispositive procedure.” 
On the other hand, relatively simpler trial procedures of the continental 
Europe mean plea bargaining remained less frequent. In such systems as Italy, 
Germany and East European countries, the need for plea bargaining is often 
linked to the rise of crime rates particularly that of complex and organized 
crimes which complicated the criminal process.61 
Unlike adversarial jurisdictions which insist on upholding plea bargaining, 
the criminal process in Ethiopia is less constrained by procedures both on paper 
and in practice. Neither over-procedures nor party autonomy/control drags the 
criminal process. Jury trials, which are often blamed for consuming considerable 
time and resource, are unknown in the Ethiopian criminal justice system. The 
criminal process is not resource intensive either. Investigations and prosecutions 
are relatively cheap. For the most part, complex procedures of investigation, 
prosecution or trial are uncharacteristic of the Ethiopian criminal process.  
The process is largely unconstrained by such procedural and evidentiary 
rules as exclusionary rules and other strict rules of evidence, disclosure rules, 
pre-trial hearings and reviews, strict standards of prosecutions. For instance, the 
standard used to press for a charge is not defined; in practice it is left for 
individual prosecutors and applied inconsistently. Nor are the sufficiency and 
reliability of prosecution evidence reviewed by courts at the pre-trial stage. 
Perhaps partly due to this, prosecutors often institute charges without sufficient 
evidence and preparation.62 Likewise, with few exceptions63 pretrial disclosure, 
which consumes time and resources and at times drags the criminal process, is 
unknown in Ethiopia.64 
                                           
59 See above section 1. 
60 J H Langbein (1979), “Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining”, Law & 
Society Review, Vol.13, No.2, p. 261.   
61 See generally Regina Rauxloh, Formalization of plea bargaining, supra note 9. 
62  This practice is ironically labeled as ‘charging to fail’.  See uses and users, supra note 36 
p. xxi. The Ethiopian Criminal Justice Policy tries to address this problem by requiring the 
Attorney General to provide for standards for measuring the sufficiency of evidence. This 
is yet to be acted upon by the newly established Attorney General. 
63 This relates to serious corruption cases, and to some extent the identity of prosecution 
witnesses attached to the charge. Incidentally, the procedure of preliminary inquiry can 
serve disclosure purposes. Yet, by and large it has not been in practice. 
64 This is not to imply that disclosure is not desirable to Ethiopia. It is essential to narrow 
down the power and resource asymmetry which prevails between the parties. That is why 
the ECJ policy has introduced disclosure. 
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The trial process is much simpler and less costly compared to other 
adversarial variants. Though largely adversarial in theory, it mainly remains less 
adversarial in practice. This is so mainly owing to the huge asymmetry of power 
and resource between the parties. The defense has very limited access to 
evidence and defendants in the majority of cases stand trial unrepresented. This 
manifestly makes lawyerly combats, protracted exchange of arguments and 
complex interpretation of issues a very rare event. No party autonomy which 
causes ‘a drain of resources`65 applies to Ethiopia. Parties, in particular the 
defence, have very little, if not at times, no control over the process. 
Nor does the rise of crime rates relating to complex and organised crimes 
complicate the Ethiopian criminal process as it does elsewhere in continental 
Europe. Interestingly, reports show that compared to industrialized nations the 
crime rate is very low in Ethiopia, which even has further dropped by 6 per 
cent.66 In general, Ethiopian courts entertain relatively simple cases.67All these 
suggest that as it stands now, overall, the criminal process is simple, less time 
consuming, and thus less expressive. This means cases can be tried with a 
reasonable time and cost without plea bargaining.  
However, this does not mean that the status quo remains forever. Changes 
could be made, and in fact some reforms are underway as can be evidenced 
from the Ethiopian Criminal Justice Policy.68 Yet, since these changes are yet to 
be in force, they are not relevant to assess the nature of the existing criminal 
process. This should not, however, create an impression that the need to 
introduce plea bargaining will arise once the reforms are implemented. This is 
because of two reasons: First, as shown below there are several legitimate ways 
through which the efficiency of the process can be enhanced. Second, the 
efficiency gains due to plea bargaining would come at a very high price –by 
trading off the overarching values of criminal justice as shown below.  
b) The size of demand and workload 
The magnitude of demand and the size and the context of workload of the 
formal system /courts are among the factors one has to explore before looking 
                                           
65 J. McEwan, ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism’, supra note 58, p. 544 (Noting that 
“…the managerialist persuasion of criminal processes in this county [England and Wales] 
will continue, and possibly strengthen, because of the drain on resources that party 
autonomy entails”.) 
66 As of 2000, the combined rate for all crimes was 115.99 per 100,000 persons. This can be 
compared with 4123.97 of the USA and 1709.88 of Japan. See Winslow, R. (2008). 
Ethiopia at:  <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/ethiopia.html. > 
(Accessed 21 January 2014). 
67 Uses and users of Justice, supra note 36, p.75. 
68 The ECJ policy targets many reforms including introduction of disclosure and pretrial 
hearing. 
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for trial avoidance procedures such as plea bargaining. On the demand side, the 
formal system (including courts) is less utilized by the society 69 (perhaps owing 
to the preference of informal dispute settlement, problems of trust in courts, and 
other procedural barriers), and, in effect, trials operate as an exception. The fact 
that trials are exceptions, simple or at least not complex imply that they are not 
resource and time intensive and thus are manageable even with limited 
resources and time. 
This does not mean the size of demand for the formal system will remain 
stagnant. Indeed, reports indicate an annual increase in the number of cases 
entering the court system at the Federal level.70 Interestingly, however, this did 
not trouble Ethiopian courts. With the implementation of multiple case flow 
management measures, “the caseload has remained under control, with judges 
handling an increasing number of cases, while continuing to maintain or 
increase the disposition rate”.71 In the circumstances, the nature of demand and 
workload which is ‘under control’ does not necessitate the use of the most 
controversial case disposition system, i.e., plea bargaining. 
Moreover, as low litigation rate or mode of dispute settlement is largely 
connected with legal culture72, it is unlikely to change significantly any time 
soon. Where demand increases and swells caseload, it can be effectively 
handled using the combination of the above measures as has already been 





                                           
69 Gebre Yntiso, et al (2011) (eds.), Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Ethiopia, 
Vol. 2 p.xi;  John W. Van Doren (1994), “Positivism and the rule of law, Formal systems 
or concealed values: A case study of the Ethiopian Legal system”, J. Transnat`l L.,Vol.3, 
p.171; UNODC Assessment, supra note 26. 
70  UNODC Assessment, supra note 26 p. 18; Hammergren (2009), L., Final Evaluation, 
Justice Subprogram of PSCAP, p. 29 (suggesting it as a sign of confidence boost in the 
system). 
71 Ibid, see also Uses and users of Justice, supra note 36. 
72 Günter Bierbrauer, (1994), “Toward an Understanding of Legal Culture: Variations in 
Individualism and Collectivism between Kurds, Lebanese, and Germans”, Law & Soc'y 
Rev., Vol.28 p.243; Max Gluckman, ed., (1969), Ideas and Procedures in African 
Customary Law, (London: Oxford Univ. Press for the International African Institute); 
William Felstiner (1974) “Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing”,  Law 
& Society Rev., Vol.9, p.63. 
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c) The Nature and causes of Delay: Can plea bargaining address them?73 
It is axiomatic to say that plea bargaining helps manage caseload and address 
problems of delay. This is not to suggest that it is a panacea for any form of 
delay regardless of its context/causes. Although it is not the purpose of this 
article to investigate the causes of delay in the Ethiopian criminal justice system, 
a brief discussion of the subject matter is necessary. Generally, the most 
common explanations of delay in criminal cases include: caseload (which is 
determined mainly by the size of demand and available resources), legal 
processes and procedures (too many procedural and evidentiary rules, strict 
standards of evidence, complexity of crimes and complex investigations, etc.), 
organisational structures and practices (actions and inactions of the parties, 
witnesses and the court), and perverse incentives/tactics.74 
Which one of the above explanations of delay applies to Ethiopia? Are there 
any other causes of delay peculiar to Ethiopia? And to what extent do these 
causes contribute to delay? Which one of these problems can be addressed by 
plea bargaining? These are central questions one has to explore before 
embarking upon the efficiency advantage of plea bargaining i.e., its importance 
to manage delay and caseload. Unfortunately, no comprehensive empirical study 
that addresses these questions has been carried out so far.  
Yet, the piecemeal studies conducted on courts at Federal level and 
observations indicate that all the above common causes of delay (other than 
legal processes and procedures) are relevant in explaining delay in the Ethiopian 
criminal process. Legal processes and procedures, which are simple and less 
complex, are remotely associated with delay. Accordingly, avoiding full-scale 
trials (the legal process and procedures) and replacing it with plea bargaining 
helps very little. Even then, should any little advantage obtained, it would come 
at a greater cost of trading off accuracy and fairness, and with other serious 
undesirable perverse effects highlighted in the following paragraphs.  
Delay of criminal justice in Ethiopia is mainly imputable to the 
ineffectiveness of legal institutions i.e., the way the investigation, prosecution 
and adjudication organs function. From some piecemeal studies and own 
                                           
73 Admittedly, for practical reasons this exercise is far from being comprehensive. Extensive 
studies are needed before plea bargaining is formally introduced.  It is unrealistic to 
simply copy foreign models and use the justice system as a guinea pig. Except the 15-
page general policy note (which describes quite few models), no study has been carried 
out to inform Ethiopia`s plea bargaining policy. 
74 Jason Payne (2007), “Criminal Trial Delays in Australia:  Trial Listings Outcomes, 
Research and Public Policy Series” No.74; Dory Reiling, et al, Justice Sector 
Assessments, Handbook available at: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/JSAHandbookWebE
dition_1.pdf>  (Accessed: 21 Jan  2013). 
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observations, the major causes of delay include75: organisational structures and 
practices, caseload, perverse incentives, and gaps in the legal framework.76 
i) Organisational structures and practices: within the Ethiopian context these 
encompass77: both judge and party initiated frequent and longer adjournments, 
gaps in accountability and effective performance measurement system, deviation 
of the practice from the law (much reliance on written submissions as opposed 
to oral arguments, less continuity of trials and more intermediate steps than 
envisaged by the law)78, lack of coordination among justice institutions, 79 
protracted case discontinuance practices and its circumvention,80 and reduced 
role of prosecutors in investigation and supervision of police –which is 
responsible for ‘enormous backlog in the prosecutorial offices’.81 While the 
Ethiopian Criminal Justice Policy and the Draft Criminal Procedure Code have 
responded to the above concerns,82 the practice of Federal courts also reveals 
that the problems can be fairly addressed.83 For instance, adjournments, the 
major sources of delay in oral proceedings, are effectively controlled.84 This 
means, plea bargaining is not essential to address the above problems. 
ii) Caseload: Of the main causes of delay, apparently caseload can be 
contained using plea bargaining. However, in reality this cannot be properly 
understood in isolation from the context of caseload. Such factors as the 
magnitude of the caseload, the variables that explain it, the available alternatives 
                                           
75 Uses and users of Justice, supra note 36, pp. 73-84; See also MenberetsehaiTadesse 
(2010), “የተዘነጉ የወንጀል ፍትሕ ሥርዓት ድንጋጌዎች/ Yetezenegu yewonjel fitihe sera`at 
dingagewoch” (Amharic), Ethiopian Bar Review, Vol. 4 No.1, p. 11. 
76 This is not to suggest that these are the only causes. Further research is needed to have a 
complete picture of the problem and the extent to which each factor contributes to the 
delay. 
77 FDRE, Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program, Base Line Study (hereinafter CJR 
Baseline Study) (2005) pp.61-2; Uses and users of Justice, supra note 36, p. 11; See also 
Menberetsehai Tadesse, supra note 75, p.11. 
78 Menberetsehai Tadesse, supra note 75, p 11. 
79 CJR Baseline Study, supra note 77, pp.61-62 (“The lack of co-operation between 
practitioners is a prevalent and unfortunate characteristic of the justice system as a 
whole”). However, it is important to note that currently there are some developments in 
this regard -notably the joint investigation of crimes and joined-up justice conferences.  
80 “Prosecutors often find it easier and more efficient to wait until the case reaches [period 
of] limitation rather than reporting to their superiors on their decision”. This created case 
backlog. See CJR baseline study, supra note 77, p.185. 
81 Uses and users of Justice, supra note 36, p. 11. 
82 Both the Policy and Draft Criminal Procedure Code have embraced efficiency enhancing 
measures and procedures including setting case processing time limits, ADRs, RTD, 
pretrial hearing, etc. 
83 Uses and users of Justice, supra note 36, p. 11. 
84 Id., p. vxi. 
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to fix it, among others, are crucial in determining whether caseload necessitates 
the controversial trial avoidance procedure of plea bargaining. Caseload is 
directly related to the size of demand and the availability of material and human 
resources. In Ethiopia, with the overwhelming majority of cases being handled 
through CDRs (Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanisms), the size of 
demand to courts is extremely low85 while material and human resources are 
generally scanty. From this it follows that caseload is linked to limited human 
and material resources, and perhaps the inefficient performance of justice 
institutions than the size of demand.86 Thus, without fulfilling minimum 
standards in terms of personnel and material resources, and putting in place 
effective case management systems, it is simply unacceptable to blame the 
criminal  justice system of delay and search for its solution elsewhere by 
resorting to plea bargaining. The delay caused by caseload can be effectively 
addressed with a modest increase in human and material resources and putting 
in place effective case management systems including effective performance 
measurement. Indeed, the experience of Federal courts where they managed to 
reduce backlog despite the rise of caseload, lends strong support to this 
conclusion as indicated below.  
iii) Perverse incentives/tactics: This may take many forms. In theory, this 
could be imputable to the conduct of the parties (defendants, defence attorney, 
and the prosecution), or the court. While data on most of these is unavailable, 
excessive appeal rate and its use for dilatory tactics are documented. Court 
statistics show an increasing appeal rate even though the success rate remains 
low.87 Studies show that Federal courts are making ‘considerable progress’ in 
controlling appeal-generated delay.88 Other commonly abused procedures or 
dilatory motions such as disclosure motions are currently less relevant for 
Ethiopia as they are yet to be in use.89 Should such procedures be a cause for 
concern in due course, they can be strictly regulated. 
iv) Gaps in the legal framework: this relates to the absence of standard on the 
reasonable case processing time, i.e., no limit on how long a case should last 
                                           
85 Supra note 69. 
86 One study attributed the problems to poor resources (human and material) and bad 
performances of legal professionals. See CJR Baseline Study, supra note 77, p.62. Here, it 
is important to note that this study is a bit old (2005). But in the absence of any recent 
baseline study, it can provide us a sense of the problem. 
87 For instance, at the FSC criminal appeal rate was 25 per cent in 2005-06 and rose to 40 
per cent in 2008-09. Yet, reversal rate is very low i.e. below 10 per cent which is far 
below the standard for efficient appeal system i.e., low appeal rate and 50 per cent 
reversal rate.  See uses and users of justice, supra note 36, pp. 58-59 and 81-84. 
88 Id., p. 83. 
89 The ECJ policy recognizes both prosecution and defense disclosure. 
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(disaggregated by investigation, prosecution90, trial91 , and appeal) and no limit 
on remands, which often results in successive and unwarranted remands and 
adjournments. Plea bargaining is of no or insignificant avail to address causes of 
delay such as gaps in the legal framework. This can be addressed by making 
sure that any legal gap is covered rather than resorting to plea bargaining. 
In the circumstances where case backlog and delay are much less correlated 
with the nature of trials, and can be fixed using other options notably backlog 
reduction programs, and other trial alternatives, plea bargaining (avoiding trials) 
helps very little to ensure the desired efficiency gains. As shown above, the 
causes of delay largely rest, among others, on the capacity of legal institutions, 
frequent and longer adjournments, gaps in the legal framework and gaps in 
practice. Consequently, delay is largely avoidable and efficiency can be ensured 
without plea bargaining. The experience of Ethiopian courts, which is separately 
discussed below, lends solid support for this. 
d) Patterns of delay and its management  
A noticeable development on the trends of delay in Ethiopia has to do with its 
tendency of reduction despite growth of caseload. As World Bank survey states: 
“As a result of their programs, and the use of the database, the courts not only 
keep track of disposition times, but also have succeeded in reducing them for the 
most part, both in original jurisdiction cases and at the appellate levels”.92 The 
use of digital case tracking system has helped both federal and regional courts93 
to collect data on productivity, clearance and congestion rates, appeal rates, 
execution of judgements, percentage of case resolved within specific time 
frames, and number of adjournments.94 This enables courts to reduce delays.95 
Courts at both the Federal and Regional level have eliminated their backlogs, 
with the majority of pending cases less than 6 months old.96 According to 
UNDOC Assessment Report97  the fundamental problems of backlog and delay 
                                           
90 Perhaps the exception is the time limit to institute a charge which is fixed by law to be 15 
days as of the receipt of police investigative file. See Article 109 Criminal Procedure 
Code. However, the fact that this is not sanctioned by law makes the standard 
meaningless. It is not observed in practice, either. See Tsehai Wada (2010) “Timely 
Disposition of Criminal Cases in Ethiopia”, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol.24 No.1, p.74. 
91 For discussion on the length of trial and adjournments, see Id, p.64-68. 
92 Uses and Users of Justice, supra note 36 p. xxiii. 
93 Unlike in Federal courts, the digital tracking system is not fully installed at all regional 
courts. See J. Plummer (2012), Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia: Perceptions, 
Realities, and the Way Forward for Key Sectors (Washington D.C.: World Bank), p. 203. 
94 Uses and Users of Justice, supra note 36; Ibid.  
95 Ibid  
96 UNDOC Assessment, supra note 26, p.18. 
97 Id, p.19. 
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in Ethiopia are being effectively addressed “while coping with significant 
resource constraints”.  
The management of backlog/delay is attributed to the implementation of the 
following various measures/policies,98 namely: limiting the duration and number 
of adjournments99, judges’ performance management systems (tracking judges` 
disposition rates and times), increasing the number and skills of judges and 
prosecutors, ADR strategies, police-prosecution joint investigation100, Real 
Time Dispatch (RTD), the new sentencing guidelines, the reorganization of 
social courts, and court annexed ADR programs. This reveals that congestion 
and delay can be effectively managed by scaling up and consolidating these 
measures without the need to apply plea bargaining. This is not to suggest that 
delay and congestion cannot recur and cause pressure on the system. 
Admittedly, it is a common concern for any system. But the point here is that 
short of the most discredited plea bargaining, there are several legitimate ways 
of handling it as can be evidenced from the above experiences and the use of 
various dispute resolution alternatives. 
3.2 Alternatives to plea bargaining  
The extensive application of customary case disposition mechanisms and forms 
of abbreviated trials and specialized procedures take substantial credit in 
promoting efficiency. In Ethiopia, Customary Dispute Resolution (CDR) 
appears to have a high potential and a greater prospect than any other trial 
alternatives targeted by the government, provided that its limitations, in 
particular its incompatibility with human rights (rights of vulnerable groups), 
procedural fairness are sufficiently addressed. Various reasons101 justify this 
argument. First, CDR is not alien to Ethiopia but rather has been a well-
entrenched practice. Unlike transplants of plea bargaining, it is not affected by 
problems of legitimacy and resistance, which ultimately facilitates its smooth 
                                           
98 Uses and Users of Justice, supra note 36 p. 20; UNDOC Assessment, supra note 26, p.18; 
Ministry of Justice & Region Justice Bureaus (Justice Sectors) Five Years (2010/11-
2014/15) Strategic Plan, (July 2010). (Hereinafter ‘Justice Sector Strategic Plan’). 
99 To reduce delay, Federal Courts adopt the following policy on adjournments: “No judge-
initiated adjournments are allowed; where the defendant does not appear, the hearing will 
go on without him/her; the general aim is to have hearings continuous without any 
intermediate recesses. Moreover, judge’s performance is measured based on the number 
of cases disposed per month”. Id, p. 78. 
100 Prosecutors investigate crimes with police thereby avoiding the earlier delayed exchanges 
of investigation files between them, and thus contributing to the reduction delay.  See 
Uses and Users of Justice, supra note 36 p.11. 
101 For more advantages of CDR/ADR as well as its limitations, see Alula Pankhurst and 
Getachew Assefa (2008) (Eds), Grass-roots Justice in Ethiopia: The Contribution of 
Customary Dispute Resolution (Centre Français des Etudes Ethiopiennes, Addis Ababa) 
pp.260-65. 
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application. Second, unlike other modes of case disposition (such as trial and 
plea bargaining), CDR involves a win-win approach, consequently satisfying 
both victims and defendants which in itself is vital in bringing lasting peace. 
This is important especially in Ethiopia for it may minimize revenge and self-
help measures. Third, unlike other alternatives, it is accessible and is very cheap, 
the parties incurring no or little cost in the process.That is why the Ethiopian 
Criminal Justice policy recognizes CDR principles and CDR institutions.102 
Established at Kebele level [the lowest administrative unit], social courts 
provide accessible forum for the society to resolve disputes involving less 
serious crimes. Social courts could process cases more efficiently since the 
procedure they apply is simple, informal and amicable. This would enable 
regular courts to focus on more serious crimes and thus manage their 
caseloads.103 This is particularly the case with the reorganisation of social courts 
and the expansion of their jurisdiction which was originally limited to petty 
offences.104 Although data on the disposition rate of social courts is unavailable, 
they are generally credited for playing their part in enhancing the efficiency of 
the justice system.105 
Modelled after its French analogue, Real Time Dispatch (RTD) or Next day 
justice courts are established in Ethiopia to dispose of flagrant cases and non-
flagrant cases where evidence is readily available. In spite of some concerns of 
fairness to defendants (which can be addressed by guarantying the defence more 
time and legal counsel), RTD could be generally seen as a success in terms of 
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal process.106 By 
rectifying its limitations particularly improving its fairness to defendants, the 
criminal justice system can benefit more from the procedure of RTD. 
The guilty plea  procedure in Ethiopia is not just one form of evidence as is 
the case with inquisitorial systems, but like adversarial systems, it is capable of 
avoiding full scale trials and leading to immediate case disposition.107 By 
                                           
102 The ECJ Policy supra note 32, section 4.1(d) and section 4.6.1 p. 38. 
103 There are concerns on the quality of decisions social courts handed down. Such problems 
need to be investigated and addressed so that the system draws more benefits from social 
courts. 
104 See, for example, Addis Ababa City Government  Kebele Social Courts Amendment 
Proclamation, 2007.  Proclamation No 31 Addis Negarit Gazeta.Year 5, No 54. 
105 Justice Sector Strategic Plan, supra note 98. 
106 Ibid. 
107 The does not imply that convictions necessarily follow guilty pleas like in  the classical 
adversarial systems. The court retains the discretion either to immediately convict the 
accused or demand the prosecution to present the full case. See Article 135 of the 1961 
Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia. In deciding over these options, it naturally assesses 
the validity of the giulty plea –the court determines whether the guilty plea is entered  
voluntarily and intelligently. 
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sparing resources and time for trial and prosecution, this enhances the efficiency  
of the system. Before rushing to plea offers (plea bargaining), the guilty plea 
patterns in Ethiopia should be investigated which mainly inculde: guilty plea 
rates (i.e. the percentage of cases with a guilty plea as compared with the totality 
of cases), the disincentives against and the incentives toward pleading guilty or 
not guilty, and the magnitude of the factors and incentives that influence the 
pattern. Probably, one may get the desired efficiency gains with accurate and 
fair guilty plea dispositions without the need to resort to plea bargaining. 
The problem of late guilty pleas which are sometimes referred to as cracked 
trials, and often described as wasteful, need be addressed. Ethiopian courts 
approach late guilty pleas disparately. While some reject late guilty pleas 
altogether, others admit them any time before judgement without considering 
the time/stage of pleading guilty in determining the amount of sentence 
reduction.108 Thus, regardless of the particular time the guilty plea is tendered, 
defendants stand to benefit flat sentence mitigation, ceteris paribus.  This could 
discourage earlier guilty pleas and promote tactical moves thereby wasting time 
and scarce resources. 
3.3  Efficiency vs. other adverse effects  
Some suggest that beneath the efficiency justification rests the failure of 
governments to adjudicate each case that flows to the justice system with 
integrity and diligence. While this could be partly true, it does not mean that 
plea bargaining offers no efficiency gains. For Ethiopia, however, it would be, 
as shown above, much less efficient than perceived. And to the extent it is 
acknowledged for efficiency, it comes at a greatest cost –by trading away the 
overarching values of the criminal justice namely fairness and accuracy for 
efficiency. In jurisdictions like Ethiopia, plea bargaining is very likely to entail 
the following unintended perverse effects:  
First, it is open to abuse and corruption in Ethiopia where the capacity of 
legal institutions is less developed, the prevailing legal culture, in particular rule 
of law is utterly weak109 and accountability is intolerably low110, the excessive 
                                           
108 Alemu Meheretu, Introducing plea bargaining, supra note 26, pp. 159-60. 
109  On several measurements of rule law, Ethiopia’s performance is among the countries 
that are at the bottom in terms of ranking. See M Agrast et al ,WJP Rule of Law Index 
2011 (Washington, D.C.: The World Justice Project) p.60; Linn A. Hammergren (2012), 
“Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia” in[ Janelle Plummer(ed), Diagnosing corruption 
in Ethiopia: Perception, Realities and the way forward for key Sectors (Washington DC, 
The World Bank) p. 200] (noting that despite improvements, the government`s desire to 
maintain power conflicts with rule of law); A. Abebe (2012), “Rule by law in Ethiopia: 
Rendering Constitutional limits on Government Power Nonsensical” CGHR Working 
Paper 1, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human 
Rights)( showing that Ethiopia is a rule by law state ). 
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discretion involved in the proposed model of plea bargaining interacted with the 
lack of transparency inherent in plea negotiations. Justice actors concede that 
plea bargaining in Ethiopia risks corruption.111 In the absence of independent 
and vibrant media (which are critical of the justice system) such abuse and 
corruption would remain undisclosed. 
Second, it undermines defendants’ rights. Its inherent dissonance with human 
rights of defendants112 reinforced by the prevailing poor human rights record 
(weak protection of defendants’ rights in the criminal process in particular),113 
plea bargaining would leave defendants’ rights at a greater risk. A case in point 
is confession. As it is reliant on confessions/ guilty pleas whose reliability 
cannot be properly tested, plea bargaining could reinforce the use of coerced 
confessions. This would be all the more troubling in Ethiopia where procedural 
safeguards against forced confessions are scanty and members of the police are 
often accused of using torture and other improper methods to extract 
confessions.114 
                                                                                                            
110 The WJP Rule of law index puts Ethiopia at the bottom in terms of accountability among 
the 66 surveyed countries. The report states: Accountability is very weak by regional 
standards (ranking 63rd globally and second to last among low income nations). See M. 
Agrast et al WJP Rule of Law Index, supra note 109. 
111 On average, more than two-third of the justice actors participated in a study believe that 
plea bargaining in Ethiopia is likely to invite corruption.  See Alemu Meheretu 
Introducing plea bargaining, supra note 26, p. 253. 
112 Plea bargaining is inherently incompatible with such rights of defendants as the right to 
be presumed innocent, the right to equality, the right to appeal, and the right to silence.  
For example, see Andrew Sanders et al (2010), Criminal Justice (Oxford University 
Press); Phillip R. Spicer (1982), “Overview: Plea bargaining in Texas” St. Mary`s L.J. 
Vol.14, pp.74-75. For a contextual analysis of the problem, see Alemu Meheretu, The 
Proposed Plea Bargaining, supra note 42. 
113 One writer notes that “human right in Ethiopia is a luxury which the government does not 
take seriously and their inclusion in the Constitution is simply a matter of formalism”, 
see John Markakis (2006), Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity (Addis Ababa, 
Shama Books), p. 333; See also reports of human rights groups as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, US State Department (all accusing the government of human 
rights violations). 
114 Most defendants face criminal prosecution without a lawyer and with no pretrial review 
of evidence. There are reports that police routinely use torture to extract confessions. See 
for example Reports by UN Committee against Torture (2010) (expressing its deep 
concerns over “the numerous, ongoing, and consistent allegations” on “the routine use of 
torture”); The African Commission on Human & People’s Rights Resolution No. 218, 
2012; Amnesty International Annual Report 2013 available at:  
      <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/ethiopia/report-2013>, (Accessed: 25 June 2014). 
(Reporting that during interrogations detainees are tortured, ill-treated and forced to sign 
confession documents). 
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Third, it is likely to result in wrongful convictions. The prosecutor’s 
discretion to pick charges, huge sentencing differentials, the circumvention of 
fact-finding process and standard of proof would induce innocents (who are risk 
averse) to plead guilty. This would be exacerbated by contexts and structural 
limitations in Ethiopia,115 such as: the particulars of defendants (poor, 
uneducated, unrepresented defendants), fact finding problems, abuses of arrest 
and remand,116 prolonged pre-trial detention and poor conditions of detention 
centres117 and weak legal profession and ethics. Under the guise of encouraging 
guilty pleas, plea bargaining can become coercive and produce unreliable and 
inaccurate outcomes. Innocents who intend to cover up real criminals in 
exchange for a payment or simply to cover up their loved ones could also be 
easily convicted.118 Although trials are not immune from wrongful convictions, 
plea bargaining is more prone to it. By offering attractive concessions, 
circumventing the fact-finding process and lowering the standard of proof, it 
could reinforce such motives thereby increasing push factors for innocents to 
plead guilty. This plainly offends the very purpose of the criminal process. 
4. Remorse as Justification for Plea Bargaining 
Remorse forms one of the justifications often raised to support plea bargaining. 
The ECJ policy validates plea bargaining from remorse perspective –it is 
claimed that by encouraging remorse, plea bargaining facilitates the 
rehabilitation of offenders.119 This penology based justification makes two 
assumptions: First, it assumes that all guilty pleaders are remorseful. The second 
assumption is a corollary of the first–that a remorseful defendant will take 
lesson from his/her past wrong and is less likely to commit another crime, and 
hence ‘deserves less moral condemnation’ than defendants who insist on 
challenging the prosecution`s case.120 Both are simplistic assumptions, however. 
While the possibility of having defendants who plead guilty out of pure remorse 
                                           
115 For details, see Alemu Meheretu, Introducing Plea Bargaining, supra note 26, pp.170-183. 
116 Linn A. Hammergren, supra note 109,  p. 215; Country Report on Human Rights Practice 
for 2012, United States Department of State available at 
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/af/204120.htm>, p. 4(March14/13). 
117 EHRC (Ethiopian Human Rights Commission). “Report on Visits to 35 Federal and 
Regional Prisons.”, (2008, EHRC, Addis Ababa); Justice sector strategic plan, supra note 
98 (indicating such problems as inadequate prison services and overcrowded prisons and 
absence of national statistics on prisoners); Country Report on Human Rights Practice, 
supra note 116(`Prison and pre-trial detention center conditions remained harsh and in 
some cases life threatening…`). 
118 While training prosecutors, one prosecutor told me a case where a sister pleaded guilty of 
murder simply to cover up her brother, the breadwinner to the family. 
119 The ECJ Policy, supra note32, p.36. 
120 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, plea bargaining debate, supra note 47. 
366                           MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.2                              December 2017  
 
 
cannot be ruled out, quite often defendants plead guilty for a host of reasons that 
are extraneous to remorse121: where evidence against them is overwhelming; 
where they are advised by their attorneys; simply to avoid ‘process costs’ –
guilty pleas triggered by material and emotional costs of trial; or where they are 
induced by sentence differentials –a guilty plea can be entered simply to avoid 
severe punishments at trial.  As Alschuler observes “… most guilty pleas are not 
the fruit of genuine repentance. Instead, defendants feign repentance to earn 
sentence reductions”.122 Some challenge the remorse rationale on grounds of 
practicability. They simply doubt whether it is practically possible to distinguish 
remorse motivated guilty pleas from tactical ones. 
What is more the lenient sentence the defendant receives in exchange for 
pleading guilty may not be proper in achieving the purposes of punishment be it 
rehabilitation, retribution or deterrence. Since remorse is no guarantee that an 
offender may not repeat his/her wrongs, it hardly goes with the rationale of 
general deterrence.123 Ironically, some scholars show on empirical terms that 
“guilty plea defendants repeat their crimes at approximately the same rate as 
defendants convicted at trial and sometimes, in fact, at a higher rate”.124 On the 
contrary, plea bargaining can have perverse effects on punishment. A more 
lenient sentence in plea bargaining sends a message to offenders that justice can 
be purchased and that they can easily beat the system, which can in effect 
weaken the deterrent effect of punishment.125 Nor does the plea bargaining 
                                           
121 Empirical studies have disproved the rhetoric/assumption that guilty pleas are the 
consequence of genuine remorse. See M McConvilleet al (1991), The Case for the 
Prosecution. (London: Routledge); D Newman (2012), ‘Still Standing Accused: 
Addressing the Gap between Work and Talk in Firms of Criminal Defence Lawyers”, 
Int. Journal of the Legal Prof., Vol.19, No.1, p.3-27. For more general discussions, see 
Albert W. Alschuler (1983), “Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System”, U. Chi. L. Rev., Vol. 50, pp. 949-52. (where 
the writer identifies three types of guilty pleas: “no dispute” guilty pleas (guilty pleas not 
disputed as the defendant pleads guilty out of remorse or for lack of defense), “process 
cost” guilty pleas (guilty pleas triggered by material and emotional costs of trial), and 
“bargained” guilty pleas (guilty pleas induced by sentence differentials). 
122 Albert W. Alschuler, plea bargaining debate, supra note 47, pp.662-3. 
123 Andrew Ashworth (2000), Sentencing and Criminal Justice,3rd ed. (London: 
Butterworths), p.143.  For more critics on remorse justification, see, for instance. A. 
Sanders and R Young (2000), Criminal Justice, (2nd ed.) (London: Butterworths), p. 
401; p. Darbyshire, The Mischief of plea bargaining, supra note 6, p. 901. 
124 W. Rhodes (1978), Plea Bargaining: Who Gains? Who Loses? PROMIS Research 
Publication No. 14 (INSLAW); A Alschuler, Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 47, pp. 
661-662. 
125 Kenneth Kipnis (1976), supra note 3 p. 93; R.A. Fine (1987), supra note 3, p.615 
(arguing that plea bargaining encourages crime by weakening the credibility of the 
system). 
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sentence match the seriousness of the crime and the degree of guilt. Plea 
bargaining, which operates on charge and sentence concessions, is often 
characterized by impunity and/or under-punishment. In the circumstances, the 
retributive purpose of punishment remains unattended. 
Another limitation of the ‘penological’ rationale relates to the contrary 
understanding of the assumptions the rationale is based. It posits that while 
guilty pleaders are remorseful, those who contest prosecution are not and thus 
deserve no leniency. This appears preposterous, however. As defendants might 
plead guilty for reasons extraneous to remorse, they might plead not guilty and 
contest prosecution for a number of factors that have nothing to do with absence 
of remorse: ill comprehension of the process, attorney`s advice, strong defence, 
actual innocence and litigious culture, among others.126 
The remorse justification has been treasured by many jurisdictions including 
England and the USA for long. Since the landmark cases of Turner (UK) and 
Brandy (USA), remorse constitutes one of the main rationales of plea 
bargaining.127 Yet, experience shows that through time it has now lost force in 
both jurisdictions. In England, there is shift of emphasis from the rationale of 
remorse to efficiency and case management justifications.128 
5. The Justification of Avoiding the Trauma of Trials 
Some argue that both victims and defendants often need to avoid the publicity 
and trauma of trials and instead prefer plea bargaining for it better serves their 
interests to this end.129 Likewise, the ECJ policy states that plea bargaining 
benefits both defendants and victims by shielding them from the trauma of 
trials.130 Here the assumption is that plea bargaining spares defendants and 
victims from trial inconveniences and, avoids the stigma and embarrassment of 
going public in a trial both for the defendant and the victim. In this sense, it is 
maintained that plea bargaining promotes defendants` and victims` interests. 
                                           
126 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea bargaining debate supra note 47; see also supra note 45. 
127 Fiona Leverick (2004), “Tensions and Balances, Costs and Rewards: The Sentence 
Discount in Scotland”, Edin.L.R., p. 371; Brandy v. United States, [1970] 397 U.S.742, 
753. 
128 Supra note122; Juliet Horne “Plea Bargains, Guilty Pleas and the Consequences for 
Appeal in England and Wales”, Warwick School of Law Research Paper No. 2013/10 
(Special Plea Bargaining Edition). Available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286681 or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2286681> 
(Accessed 29 March 2016)>. 
129  D. Newman (1996), Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 
(Little Brown and Company), p.96;Nancy McDonough (1979), “Plea Bargaining: A 
Necessary Evil”, U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. Vol.2, p. 386. 
130 The ECJ Policy, supra note 32 p. 36 (author’s translation). 
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However, this validation is far-fetched for it completely trades away the merits 
of trial as well as the interests of victims and defendants in trials, and tends to 
portray plea bargaining as the best option available to promote their interests.  
5.1  The justification of avoiding defendant’s trauma  
It is often proposed that beyond reducing the sentences, plea bargaining enables 
defendants to have a criminal record of a less serious crime and saves them from 
public stigma and repercussions of serious criminal records such as suspension 
of civil and political rights. However, these justifications, in particular the one 
which purports to protect defendants from the public stigma, serve no legitimate 
purpose of the criminal justice. On the contrary, by treating defendants leniently 
and avoiding the social stigma associated with public trials, it could negatively 
impact on the deterrent effect of punishment. Even if this objective is sought, 
plea bargaining is ill suited, because it merely spares the hearing of evidence; 
the plea agreement would still be endorsed in an open court, and publicity 
eventually ensues via the press. Perhaps by enabling defendants to plead guilty 
to a lesser crime, it may neutralize the stern public sigma associated with serious 
crimes. But this comes at a higher price, i.e., at the cost of undermining the 
principle of proportionality of sentences and the purpose of punishment. 
The Draft Criminal Procedure Code subscribes to the efficiency rationale and 
claims that plea bargaining spares justice actors` time and resources. One can 
imply the defence here. Although, not mentioned in the reform, it is often 
suggested that plea bargaining enables defendants receive lenient sentences. 
Yet, this hardly justifies plea bargaining for it is extraneous to the aims of the 
justice system, if not contravening its purposes. Where a defendant deserves 
leniency, this can be done without plea bargaining. Legislative reforms on 
sentences and trials can effectively achieve this. In trials, mitigating grounds 
including guilty pleas can be used to this end. 
For the most part, plea bargaining benefits justice professionals and the 
justice system, and the advantages to the defendant are not only ancillary but 
also likely to be overwhelmed by the former.131 On the contrary, there are 
considerable instances where plea bargaining can be counterproductive to 
defendants. Notably, it is likely to result in wrongful conviction of innocent 
defendants and discrimination against similarly situated defendants. Certainly, 
the above justifications of plea bargaining are too weak to prevail over the 
adverse effects of plea bargaining.  
 
 
                                           
131 See generally R. Rauxloh (2012), Plea Bargaining in National and International Law 
(New York, NY: Routledge). 
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5.2 The victim-oriented justification  
The claim that plea bargaining helps victims avoid the trauma of trial is not 
compelling. First, the trauma of public trials is an issue for victims in some 
specific crimes committed against interests that are predominantly private in 
nature, leaving the vast majority of crimes unaffected or at least less affected. 
The need for privacy is especially felt in crimes such as sexual crimes. Victims 
of such crimes do not feel comfort to stand trial as a witness and be cornered 
with questions that flow from direct as well as cross examinations from their 
assailer. However, this can be regulated using other measures as anonymous 
witnesses and trial in camera rather than doing away with the trial altogether. 
Second, lenient treatment of defendants in plea bargains hardly satisfies 
victims and the public. Instead, it is likely to undermine their trust in the justice 
system and push them to self-help measures. Victims are morally satisfied 
seeing their perpetrator receive the deserved punishment rather than a lenient 
sentence that follows plea bargaining. Yet, in plea bargaining they observe 
defendants pleading guilty to less serious offence than what is actually 
committed and lenient sentence, which does not reflect the seriousness of the 
crime, being imposed.  
The concern would be all the more worrisome in the Ethiopian context. 
According to the observations of some judges, in serious crimes such as murder, 
relatives of victims sometimes tend to deliberately work toward an acquittal of 
the offender (by providing exculpating information) so as to take self-help 
measures later.132 In property related crimes (such as theft and robbery), the 
Federal Supreme Court sentencing manual attaches the amount of sentence to 
the value of the property against which the offence is committed. This approach, 
which substantially reduces sentence, has sparked public (including victims) 
dissatisfaction, and even some dubbed the manual as: ‘a defender of thieves’.133 
From these, it follows that plea bargaining, an institution characterized by 
lenient treatments and propensity of corruption, could make victims lose 
confidence and resort to self-help measures. 
Third, plea bargaining, on top of denying victims any meaningful 
participation in the process, makes them lose their participation even as a 
witness. All the above may have frustrating effects on victims –which in turn 
may negatively affect reporting of crimes and trigger self-help measures. Lastly, 
plea bargaining denies the public including victims a forum for wider discussion 
and the benefit of cathartic roles of trials.134 
                                           
132 Alemu Meheretu, Introducing Plea Bargaining, supra note 26.  
133 Id., p. 188. 
134 Cyrus Tata & Jay M. Gormley, (2016), “Sentencing and Plea Bargaining: Guilty Pleas 
Versus Trial Verdicts, Oxford Handbook on line”, p.12. 
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Perhaps, plea bargaining could promote victims` interest only when it allows 
them a meaningful participation, if not a veto, to influence the plea agreement. 
Nonetheless, this is a test plea bargaining, in general and the proposed variant, 
in particular, barely passes. Admittedly, the prosecution is required to consult 
victims in its plea bargaining decisions and where necessary to have them attend 
the process.135This, nonetheless, falls short of ensuring meaningful participation. 
Whether to have victims attend in the process is entirely within the 
prosecution`s discretion. Besides, the duty to consult is not sanctioned. Even 
where the prosecution honours its duty; victims may remain a passive spectator, 
and they may not directly participate in the process. Nor are they provided with 
a forum in which their voice is heard before court. There is no obligation on the 
part of the court to consider victims’ interests and needs while endorsing plea 
agreements, either. Therefore, the claim that plea bargaining promotes victims` 
interests is superficial and misleading. 
Conclusion  
The FDRE Criminal Justice Policy validates plea bargaining based on its 
traditional rationales: the penological/remorse rational, defendant and victim 
oriented justifications and the efficiency justification. The penological rationale 
erroneously assumes that guilty pleas are remorse motivated, an assumption 
which is difficult to sustain in the circumstances where defendants plead guilty 
for a host of reasons other than remorse. Moreover, it lacks theoretical 
foundation for it hardly fits in with the purposes of punishment. This is why the 
remorse rationale has lost its force even in jurisdictions like the USA and UK 
where it was upheld for a long time.  
Defence and victim oriented justifications are based on assumptions of their 
meaningful participation in the process –assumptions which are largely romantic 
than real, in particular in the proposed variant of plea bargaining and within the 
Ethiopian context. The –limited role of defendants in plea negotiations in 
general136 (which is constrained by the institutional imbalance of bargaining 
power, disproportionate interests at stake, among others), the possibility of 
competent representation less likely in plea bargains137, and coercive sentencing 
                                           
135 See Article 226 of the Draft Criminal Procedure Code. 
136 Frank H. Stephen, et al (2008), “Incentives, Criminal Defence Lawyers and Plea 
bargaining”, Int’l Rev. L. & Econ.Vol.28, p.212 (suggesting …qualitative evidence exists 
on the passive role played by criminal defendants in the plea bargaining process). 
137 With financial and non-financial incentives involved, the defence counsel may find it 
difficult to choose trial against plea bargaining even if his client`s interest so suggests. 
See Albert Alschuler (1975), “The Defence Attorney`s Role in Plea bargaining”, Y.L.J 
Vol. 84, p. 1180 (who argues that [plea bargaining] subjects defence attorney to serious 
temptation to disregard their clients’ interests.)  
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differentials show that meaningful participation of the defence is less probable. 
This is likely to be exacerbated in Ethiopia by the dire defense resources, and by 
the particular circumstances of defendants who are mainly poor, illiterate and 
unrepresented. 
Similarly, the victim oriented justification –i.e., the claim that plea 
bargaining helps victims avoid the trauma of trials– ignores the overriding 
merits of trials in terms of making the offender accountable and punishing 
him/her with the deserved punishment. The lenient treatment of offenders which 
epitomises plea bargaining rather offends victim`s interests. The Ethiopian 
Criminal Justice policy simply overstates the advantages of plea bargaining 
while neglecting the pressing problems it may create for victims and defendants 
alike. Regrettably, no thorough consideration has been made on its feasibility, 
notably its implications on the fundamental principles of justice and rights of 
individuals. Conceivably, plea bargaining could promote victims` interest where 
it allows them a meaningful participation that can shape its outcome. Yet, this is 
not the case with Ethiopia`s proposed version of plea bargaining. In the 
circumstances, the justification remains a chimera. 
Ostensibly, the expediency/efficiency justification seems to have a special 
force in jurisdictions like Ethiopia whose criminal justice is poorly resourced. 
Yet, this is less compelling at least on two counts. First, the reasoning is 
divorced from being principled in that lack of resources cannot vindicate an 
encroachment of fundamental rights and freedoms. Human life and liberty are 
values that any society should cherish irrespective of its economic status. Put 
simply, efficiency cannot subordinate the substantial interest the defendant and 
the society have on constitutional rights in general and the fairness of the 
process and the accuracy of verdicts, in particular.  
Second, plea bargaining is not a panacea for all efficiency-related problems. 
The contextual investigation of the trial and delay in Ethiopia lends no solid 
support to the efficiency rationale. The fact that trials are exceptions, simple or 
at least not complex mean they are not resource and time intensive and thus are 
manageable even with limited time and resources. The cause of delay in the 
Ethiopian criminal justice is mainly attributed to the inefficiency of the system, 
and thus plea bargaining has very little role in addressing it.  To a limited extent 
it does, it comes at a very high cost –by trading off the most cherished values of 
criminal justice in Ethiopia, namely; fairness and accuracy for efficiency. 
Most importantly, the experience of Ethiopian courts provides us with 
empirical evidence that caseload and delays can be effectively managed without 
plea bargaining. Moreover, the availability of less costly but more legitimate 
methods such as RTDs, special procedures, indigenous CDRs, guilty plea 
dispositions render plea bargaining less desirable. 
One cannot see plea bargaining in isolation of the legal and political contexts 
of a nation. In jurisdictions like Ethiopia whose legal institutions tend to be 
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simple, less costly and where there are various modes of dispute resolution, case 
loads can be manageable.  
Under such settings, plea bargaining –which evades and distorts the fact 
finding process as well as fundamental safeguards jurisdictions like Eth are 
struggling to uphold– is less likely to be able to serve its intended purposes. On 
the contrary, it is very likely to entail unintended perverse effects such as 
wrongful convictions, violations of defendants’ rights, abuse or power and 
corruption which weaken the credibility and effectiveness of the justice system 
thereby impinging on its purposes.                                                                      ■ 
 
 
